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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
HILDA CRELLIN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

Case No. 7763

NOELLEEN THOMAS,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF DEFENDAN-T AND RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF CAS-E
This is an action brought by plaintiff and appellant
herein to recover damages for an alleged slander. Plaintiff alleges that on the 5th day of October, A.D. 1949, defendant said of and concerning defendant as follows:
"I told Mrs. Cummings that Mrs. Ctellin had worked in
a house of prostitution"; further plaintiff alleges defendant in the early part of April of 1949 said the, following
words of and concerning plaintiff, to wit: "Mrs. Crellin
was a whore."
Defendant testified (Trans. 39) that while plaintiff
and she were both working at the telephone office in
Tooele, Mrs. Crellin, while working on the operator's
"board" had said of another employee a single woman,
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that she had been entertaining boys at her home for $2.00
a night. Defendant testified that she then said "I thought
she was the last person on earth that should make remarks if what I heard about her was true." (Trans. 40)
When asked by Barbara Cummings, one of defendant's witnesses defendant answered, "and I told her I
had heard she came from a house of prostitution."
Defendant answered with a general denial and a
further plea in mitigation of damages that the. words, if
any, were not spoken maliciously of and concerning plaintiff. The case was tried before a jury on the 14th and
15th days of November, A.D. 1950, and upon said latter
date the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff
and against defendant, in the sum of $500.00.
Thereafter defendant mo:ved for a new trial on the
ground of newly discoiVered evidence which could not be
obtained and was not available to defendant by a diligent
search prior to the time of the first trial, which motion
was granted. Thereupon defendant amended her answer
in which she denied the allegations of plaintiff's cornplaint and as a further and affirmative defense alleged
that any words which were defamatory were true, that
defendant had investigated the activities of plaintiff in
about the year 1925 in Ely, White Pine County, State. of
Nevada; that she discovered that in about 192·4 and 1925
plaintiff had worked in two houses of prostitution, which
were then known as the "Green Lantern" or the "Big
Four Dance. Hall" and "Rhiney's Place" respectively;
that said houses were located in Ely, in the State of
Nevada, in the restricted Red Light District; that both
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of said places were houses "\Yhere lewd persons congregate
for immoral purposes; that innnoral won1en who worked
in said houses of prostitution were known as "Dance Hall
Girls" and ~'Crib girls."
The ne"\Y trial thereafter came on for hearing before
the court and jury on the 28th day of June, A.D. 1951;
that said trial lasted into the 29th day of June, A.D.
1951; upon which date the jury returned a verdict in
favor of defendant and against plaintiff, "no cause of
action."
Plaintiff appeals from the verdict and judgment
and also from the Court ruling setting aside the first
verdict and granting to defendant a new trial. (T.rans.
p. 20)
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
AS TO POINT ONE THAT THE COURT ERRED IN
GIVING THE LAST SENTENCE OF INSTRUCTION NO. 4
AND IN REFUSING TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL FOR SUCH
ERROR.

As to point one that the Court erred in giving the
last sentence of instruction No. 1 as follows:
"The Court charges you that truth is an absolute defense in action of slander, such as this case.
If therefore you find from a preponderance of the
evidence that plaintiff did at any time in her life,
work in a house of prostitution in any capacity,
then and in that event, your verdict must be in
favor of defendant and against plaintiff, 'no cause
of action.' "
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In this case it was uncontroverted that the places in
Ely, Nevada, where plaintiff worked were in an area set
apart and designated by the City Counsel of that city
as a restricted district or the red light district. Mr.
Alfred Tamblyn, a resident of Ely, White Pine County,
Nevada, testified that he had lived in that city since October, 1909; that during that time he had held many public offices and a.t the time of trial or on June 29, 1951, he
was a County Commissioner of~said county. (Trans. 79)
The witness testified that he served as the Sheriff of
White Pine County during the years 1918 and 1919; that
he had been the~ Mayor of the City of Ely from May 23,
. 1923 to May 1931. (Trans. 79) He stated that the places
known as the "Green Lantern" and "Rhiney's Place"
were located in this restricted red light district which had
been designated as such district by the city authorities
so that they could have some control over it. (Trans. 80)
He further testified that he had made many official
inspections of the places as a deputy sheriff and as the
mayor, and he described them. (Trans. 82) He testified
that the girls would dance with the patrons of the place
and would solicit men to dance with them and buy them
drinks of liquor; that sometimes the girls would go off
the. floor with these men whom they had solicited for
drinks and to rooms adjoining or close by the dance floor.
(Trans. 81) He testified further that both Rhiney's Place
and the Green Lantern had the reputation of being houses
of prostitution (Trans. 82) ; that in making his inspections as mayor of the City of Ely he observed that there
were rooms or cribs adjacent to and adjoining the dance
hall. (Trans. 82)
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He testified further that all the girls who worked
in the dance hall or in the cribs paid regular vagrancy
fines and that the .. dance hall girls" took men to their
cribs or rooms. (Trans. 83)
The witness Harold Woods for defendant described
in detail the practice and duties of a dance hall girl. He
testified that as such they approached men who entered
the dance hall and asked them to buy them a drink and
dance with them for hire; that while dancing the man was
solicited to go to the crib with her; that this was always
the procedure and manner of conducting both the so
called dance, halls known as "Rhiney's Place" and the
"Green Lantern," where plaintiff admittedly worked.
(Trans. 51) He also testified that Rhiney's Place had
the reputation and was known as a whorehouse. (Trans.
54) That the Green Lantern was also known as a house
of prostitution. He testified further from his own experience that doors led off the dance hall and into rooms
or cribs and that they were close to and adjoining the
dance hall. (Trans. 49)
Now, Mrs. Crellin, on cross examination admitted
working in Rhiney's Place as a dance hall girl and that
she solicited dances from strange men. (Trans. 20)
Further she admitted working at the Green Lantern, as
a dance hall girl. (Trans. 22)
She also testified on cross examination that she
would get paid by going to the bar after the orchestra
had stopped playing and the man whom she had solicited
would pay for the dance and would buy drinks; that she
didn't know what he drank, but that she drank caramel
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water, which was the color of whiskey, and that she received a percentage from the operator of the house for
the sale of liquor.
"Rhiney's Place" and the "Green Lantern" were admittedly located in the restricted Red Light District.
(Trans. 29)
Under all of this evidence we submit that the plaintiff in no manner has been prejudiced by the instruction
and that under the state of the record and the testimony
a different verdict could not have been rightfully rendered. The fact that the dance halls were in the restricted
red light district which wa.s admitted and not in dispute,
left the jury with only one common sense verdict; that
the plaintiff worked there as a prostitute.
For the sake of argument, even assuming the instruction was error it certainly was harmless and under
the circumstances we submit the instruction complained
of in no manner affected plaintiff or her consideration
with the jury.
An instruction which might be misleading but which
has become immaterial by reason of the findings of the
jury, is not a ground for granting a new trial. Kershaw
v. Schafer, 88 Kan. 691, 129 Pac. 1137.
In Southern Pac. Land Co. v. Dickerson, 65 Cal.
App. 722·; 225 P. 5, the California Court held:

"Where it ,is clear that the jury have disregarded an improper instruction, a new trial will
not be granted for the misdirection."
3 Am. Jur. 639 No. 1122:
"The giving of an erroneous instruction is not
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reversible error unless it results in prejudice to
the appellant or plaintiff in error by injuriously
affecting his 1naterial or substantial rights."
(Cases therein cited.)

See also Sha er v. Keeley Ice Cream Co., 65 Utah,
p. 46 (234 P. 300 4 RCL 815 Sec. 74:
"It is only ·w·hen an erroneous instruction
has resulted in prejudicing the rights of the complaining party that the judgment will be reversed
and it is the general rule that such action will not
be taken by the appellate Court for error in giving or refusing to give instructions if the verdict
is manifestly right, or if it appears from the evidence that no other verdict could have been properly returned by the jury under instructions that
were entirely correct."
We feel, however, the instruction was not error and
properly given inasmuch as it was established that the
places where plaintiff worked were in the restricted red
light district and if the jury found that the place where
plaintiff worked was a house of prostitution in view of
the evidence as to her duties, the jury could not under
any circumstances have come to any other conclusion.
In Chicago & Eastern Illinois R.R. Co. v. Kneirim,
152 Ill. 458, 43 American State Reports 260, the Court
held:
·
"An instruction though erroneous will not require the granting of a new trial if it appears from .
the evidence that no other verdict could have been
properly returned by the jury under the circumstances."
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Either by adding the words "In any capacity" or
by leaving the words out of the instruction, the jury in
this case could come to no other conclusion than that
plaintiff had been a prostitute, in view of the record of
the, evidence.
The plaintiff's testimony that the dance hall was a
legitimate business for customers in a lewd district where
prostitutes were coralled and designated to· stay, just
does not make sense.
Further as to the Court's instructions as to the
capacity, if plaintiff had testified that she worked there
as a scrub woman, or any other capacity which was foreign to prostitution, plaintiff's objection to the instruction may have been well taken. However, the admitted
business for which plaintiff worked in the district, that
of a dance hall girl in a red light district where she solicited dances from strange men and after each dance
took them to a bar where she made a percentage off the
sale of liquor, is such a nefarious occupation, that the
jury could not under any circumstances have arrived at
any other verdict.
Prostitution, and the lewd conduct of prostitutes are
of their very nature secretive and cannot be demonstrated in the open. That, of course is the reason for a community as the City of Ely designating a certain area for
them to operate and thus limit this secretive· and unwholesome occupation to a designated area. Therefore,
under the state of the record and the admitted location of
the business, the jury could not have found otherwise
under any instructions.
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In Com·monwealth v. Lavery, 93 Atl. 276, 247 Penn.
787, the Court defines a prostitute as "a woman who has
given herself up to indiscriminate lewdness."
17 Am. Jur. 109 Sec. 7:

"In the prosecution for resorting to a house
of ill fame for purposes of lewdness, however, it
is not necessary to prove that more females than
tl1e proprietress illicit acts of intercourse.
"It is necessary that the persons resorting to
such a house do so for the purpose of indulging in
lews acts, such as having sexual intercourse~."
In the present case under the instruction and taking
the testimony of plaintiff as to her capacity in the house
of prostitution how can plaintiff complain if she is said
to be a "whore." Her capacity as she testified to, was
that of soliciting men, promiscuously to dance with her
(Trans. 21) for money and buy two drinks, hers being
a drink that was camaflouged so that she would not become intoxicated, and called caramel water (Trans. 52,
line 16) and she would get a commission from the sale
(trans. p. 24).
Plaintiff testified that there were houses up and
down the street from the dance hall and that girls stood
in front of them and that these were known as "crib
girls" and that they were working on the line." Plaintiff
testified that she well knew that these girls worked in
these houses and that they either sat in the door way of
the houses or in the windows. (trans. 26)
These were the admitted surroundings of plaintiff's
employment.
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Now, when the jury, under the· instruction found the
place was a horuse of ill fame:, plaintiff cannot be heard to
complain that she was said to have been a "whore."
It is evident that the Court, by the words, "in any
capacity" intended that the jury examine plaintiff's testimony as a dance hall girl, and if the place she was working was a house of prostitution she herself might be classified as a "whore under the circumstances." A "madam"
or an operator of a house of prostitution, who does not
have sexual intercourse with men for hire, certainly cannot complain if someone said of her that she was a
"whore."

A me ric an Law Institute, Torts, p. 308, Sec. 617 :
"Subject to the control of the Court whenever
the issue arises the jury determines whether the
defamatory matter was published of and concerning the plaintiff and whethe-r it was true or false.
"COMMENT (a) The respective functions
of Court and jury upon the issue of publication
and the issue of truth are the same as upon ordinary issue of fact in other actions. The question
whether the defendant has published the defamatory communications to a third person is ordinarily one for the jury or other trier of fact to
determine. So too, it is ordinarily for the jury
to determine whether the defamatory imputations
are true. If, however, the evidence on either question is so overwhelming that any other conclusion
would be unreasonable, the Court may direct the
jury to make a proper finding."

And again A.L.I. Ch. 25. Sec. 582 P. 218:
"It is not necessary to prove the literal truth
of the precise statement made. Slight inaccuracies
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
of expression are in1material, provided the defamatory eharge is true in substance. Furthermore, it is enough to establish the truth of the
charge of a criminal offense· by a preponderance
of the evidence. It is not necessary if the person
defamed were being prosecuted for the crime
'Yhich he is charged with committing."
In the case of State v. Rice, 56 Iowa 431, the Court
held it was not for the Court to say that sexual intercourse is or is not sufficient to establish a woman to be
a prostitute. The Court:
"It is certainly true, we think, that a woman
may be a prostitute and carry on the business
as such if she holds herself out to carry on the
business of such, and if she holds herself out to
the world. The houses may be designated by a
sign as to make this clearly apparent. She may
upon the street or in other public or private places,
so conduct herself, as to make it clear she is a
prostitute therefore that Mary Royce should have
submitted herself to illicit sexual intercourse with
various persons and that 'inconsistent with one· or
two persons would not be sufficient to show she
was a prostitute.'
"We think it is for the jury to say whether
this would be sufficient, taking into.consideration
the circumstances and the: acts and conduct of
Mary Royce, at the time and before the sexual
intercourse took place."
In other words, the accompanying circumstances
are important and it is not for the Court to say the· sexual
intercourse alone is, or is not sufficient to establish the
woman to be a prostitute.
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53 C.J.S. 225 Sec. 137:
"In order to constitute a complete defense
truth pleaded in justification must meet the precise charge and be as broad as the defamatory accusation substantial truth is sufficient.
"While matter of justification by means of
a plea of the truth to be of any avail, must meet
and answer the substance of the: defamatory
charge it need not meet absolutely the letter and
form of the charge, or every word thereof, nor
need it be literally true, substantial justification
or truth that is truth in all material subjects,
being sufficient."
In Masao Yoshimura K urata v. Los Angeles News
Pub. Co., Cal. 40 Pac. 2nd 526; 4 Cal. App. 2nd 224;
Court stated (at page 522*) this rule as follows :
"It is well settled that a defendant is not required in an action of libel to justify every word
of the alleged defamatory matter; it is sufficient
if the substance, the gist, the sting of the libelous
charge be justified and if the. gist of the charge
be established by the evidence, the defendant has
made his case. A plea of justification is sustained
by justifying so much of the defamatory matter as
constitutes the sting of the charge. It is unnecessary to repeat and justify every word of the alleged defamatory matter if the substance of the
charge be· justified. If the substantial imputations
be proved true, a slight inaccuracy in the. details
will not prevent a judgment for the defendant, if
the inaccuracy does not change the complexion of
the affair so as to affeet the reader of the article
differently than the actual truth would."
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S·utheTland on Dam£~ges, \T ol. 3, p. ·2626:
''It is not the n1ere fact that difference exists
bet\Yeen the published report of what the complaint in the proceeding charged and what was
actually alleged in the complaint, but rather in the
difference of a substantial character and does it
_produce a different effect."

Hornyak v. Heart Corp., 66 N.Y.S. 2nd 848, the rule
was stated:
"In determining the sufficiency of a defense
of publication a workable test is whether the libel
as published would have a different effect on the
mind of the reader from that which the pleaded
proof would have produced."
"When the truth is so near to the facts as
published that fine and shaded distinctions must
be drawn and words passed out of the ordinary
usage to sustain a change of libel, no legal harm
has been done." (Citing Fleckenstein v. Freidman,
266 N.Y. 19; 193 N.E. 537, 538.)
See also Cafferty v. Fier, Pub. Co., 226 N.Y. 87.
Counsel commences his argument on page 17 of appellant's brief as follows:
"Granted for sake of argument that the jury
found that either the 'Green Lantern' or
'Rhiney's Place' was a house of prostitution, the
plaintiff's action was removed from the consideration of the jury."
However, the instruction complained of required
that the· jury must find the place where plaintiff worked
was a house of prostitution. We submit further the part
in "any capacity" referred specifically to a "dance hall
I
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girls'' "percentage girl"' "bee girl" or any other name
given to women in this district engaged in the unsavory
work which plaintiff admitted that she did. Therefore
her capacity was established by the plaintiff, and the
Court, we submit, rightfully instructed the jury that if
they found these facts to exist, then they must find the
issues in favor of defendant and against plaintiff, "no
cause of action."
POINT II.
NOW AS TO POINT TWO THAT THE COURT ERRED
IN GRANTING A NEW TRIAL AFTER THE FIRST TRIAL
HAD RESULTED IN A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE
PLAINTIFF.

Counsel in his brief argues that due diligence was
not exercised on the. part of the defendant in discovering this evidence, because she may have discovered it had
she taken the deposition of plaintiff or served her with
written interrogatories; and in View of the: fact that the
defendant did neither, but just stumbled on to all of the
evidence which she later found, she should later be precluded from offering it.
The defendant at the time of the first trial had no
means of knowing that the rumor she had heard and had
repeated of and concerning plaintiff, stemmed from plaintiff's activities in Ely, Nevada. In this case there has
been no showing of lack of diligence merely because defendant did not take the deposition of plaintiff, or serve
written interrogatories on her. We submit that in this
regard a wide discretion is given the trial court in view
of all the circumstances of each case.
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.. One seeking a ne"" trial for newly discovered
evidence cannot be accused of lack of diligence
when possesses no n1eans of kno,v-ing that the evidence subsequently discovered w·as previously obtainable. Henderson v. Edwards, 191 Iowa 871,
183 N.\\T. 583, 16 A.L.R. 1090. The Court at page
1092: "The right to a ne"\v trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence is statutory, and a
ruling upon the motion involves legal discretion,
and ordinarily, the ruling of the trial court will
not be disturbed on appeal unless a reasonably
clear ease of abuse or discretion is presented.' Citing Mullong v. Mullong, 178 Iowa 552, 159 N.W.
994.''
"The granting or the denial of a new trial on
the ground of newly discovered evidence is within
the discretion of the trial court, and its discretion
will not be disturbed except where there is a
clear abuse of discretion." King v. Consolidated
Products, Kan. 608, 157 P. 2nd 541, 158 A.L.R.
1248.
"A motion for a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court and its exercise of
that discretion will not be disturbed except for
manifest abuse." Nelson v. West Coast Dairy Co.,
5 Wash. 2nd 284, 105 P. 2nd 76, 130 A.L.R. 606.
See also Hamilton v. Swigact Coal Mine, 59 Wyo.
485, P. 2nd 203, 149 A.L.R. 998 ;

State v. Zimmerman, 60 N.D. 256, 253 N. W. 845,
79 A.L.R. 816.
This doctrine has been well established by this Honorable Court from time to time.
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In Glazier v. Cram, 71 Utah 465, 267 Pac. 188, this
Court held the granting or denying of a motion for a new
trial on the ground of misconduct of the jury is a matter
largely within the discretion of the trial court.

In Greco v. Gentile, 88 Utah 255, 53 P. 2nd 1155, this
Court held:
"The motion for a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence was a matter wholly
within the trial court's discretion. As long as the
discretion is not abused, this Court will not interfere."
In Jensen v. Howell, 75 Utah 64, at p. 74 (282) p.
1034, this court held :
"In this jurisdiction the binding effect of findings of the trial Court in law cases is different
from that in equity cases. In the former the findings as a general rule are approved if there is sufficient competent evidence to support them, and
ordinarily, are not disturbed unless it is manifest
that they are so clearly against the weight of the
evidence as to indicate a misconception or not a
on due consideration to it."
In the present case the court first granted defendant's motion for a new trial and thereafter set aside the
order and referred it to, Judge Ellett who held a special
hearing and made findings upon them. (R. 13) After
carefully considering the findings of Judge Ellett, Judge
Jeppson then granted a new trial.
We think the two Utah cases cited by counsel in his
brief, as to wit, Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 105 P. 2nd
176 and Bowers v. Gray, 99 Utah 336, 106 P. 2nd 765, are
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not in point and cannot apply to this case.
In both of those cases this Court pointed out that it
'vas reluctant to reverse a trial court for granting a new
trial but that there w·as apparently no basis for the trial
court's granting the new trial.

In the present case the entire newly discovere·d evidence was of such a nature that to have denied defendant's motion and refused the new trial could have been
a denial of the ends of justice to say the least.
The new evidence was of such a nature that defendant presented an entirely different defense in the: second
trial, to wit, the truth of the alleged slanderous state~
ments.
As counsel has pointed out he has found no cases
holding that unless a party to an action either take the
opponent's deposition or serve written interrogatories
on opponent before trial, that he has not exercised such
due diligence as would prevent ~he granting of a new
trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence.

We submit however, that in granting the new trial
Judge Jeppson properly exercised his discretionary
power and that there was no abuse thereof.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion we submit that the. trial Court committed no error upon either point which would justify
this Honorable Court in granting a new trial, or making
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any order other than to affir1n the judgment of the District Court.
Respectfully submitted,

LaMAR DUNCAN,

E. LeROY SHIELDS,
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
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